

THE EUROPEAN PROSPECT OF TURKEY AS PORTRAYED IN THE GREEK PRESS; THE CASE OF THE BRUSSELS' SUMMIT: A FRAMES PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict generating states and relations that exhibit a major discord dynamic, depth of time and stability with respect to their characteristics, tend to produce self-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes, frames and schemata; their own interpretative ecology, which educates the elite, the media and the public in a predefined way with respect to the perception and dealing with various situations. The relation between Greece and Turkey belongs to this category of relations *par excellence*. The suspiciousness evident in the relations of the two countries stems from a long term conflictual relationship strongly resembling the cold war. The related incidents and, mainly, their official/dominant interpretation and the transmission of the inferred conclusions to the societies via ideological mechanisms have raised a hermeneutic choker.

1999 was a landmark year; the Earthquake policy and the Helsinki Agreement led to a paradigm shift of the objectives, the policies, the rhetoric and the broader master frame, used by the Greek side with regard to the Greek-Turkish relations. An essential element evident is its attempt to liberate the public image of the country, both abroad and on the Home Front, from this continuous contradistinction with Turkey. The continuous presentation of Greece in a context of confrontation with Turkey, both on the level of the representations by the international media, but also on the level of the perceptions of the political elites around the world is pathogenic to Greece, even if it leads to the reprimand of Turkey. The reason being that this frame activates associations of Greece as a high-risk country, thus framing it as a problem rather than as an opportunity. Hence the effort being made to disassociate the image of the country from the *conflict frame* with respect to Turkey and to associate it with exclusively positive images.

At the core of the paradigm shift we find the Greek administration employing a problem-solving attitude towards Turkey, albeit one that was faced with strong

contending strategy of behalf of the latter. At the same time, the Greek administration engaged in the processes of terministic control and management of the symbolic environment in order to wear down the internal opposition and impose its preferred reading with respect to the Greek-Turkish relations. To what extent has this process of disassociation succeeded? In order to address this question we are employing bipolar contradistinction as a framing device in order to construct a typology of bipolars that organized the conflict element. The larger part of the conflictual element of the nation is organized across the Greece-Vs-Turkey conflict the less this process of disassociation has succeeded.

In this present study, we shall examine the representation of the European Prospect of Turkey in the Greek press, as it was recorded with respect to the Leaders' Summit, which took place on the 17th of December 2004 in Brussels. This is a moment, we feel, crucial for the examination of both the representations of Turkey and the Greek-Turkish relations. We must, of course, note that the change of government in Greece, on the 7th of March 2004, means that the new paradigm, while still at play, is not as vigorously supported as before, especially at the level of the home front management. Another objective of this study is to present frame theory as an analytical instrument with respect to the Greek-Turkish relations, and to identify related framing processes and expand the typology of relevant frames.

Epistemologically this study may be placed within the board boundaries of International Communication, a scientific field based on international relations and communication studies. We must point out that the present study is conducted under the focus of communication studies, rather than international relations. This project consists of two parts: in the first part, frames and framing are presented, while in the second we shall present the methodology and the results of the research itself.

1. ON FRAMES AND FRAMING

1.1 DEFINING FRAMES

The term 'frame' is defined as a schema of interpretation that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their living space and the world at large (Goffman, 1974:21). Gitlin (1980:6) defines frames as 'principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters' while Reese (2003:11) defines them as 'organizing principles that are socially shared and persisted over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world'. Frames may be explicit components of messages, implied by word or name or image selections in the

message or even activated in the audience without the audience awareness that activation is taking place. (Cappella and Jamieson 1997:44). According to Entman (1993:52) the process of framing is: "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation". Frame is a way of drawing attention to certain aspects of an issue while minimizing attention to others.

Frames operate both at the level of the audience and at the level of the media content. Kinder and Sanders (1990:74) differentiated between frames as internal structures of the mind and frames as devices embedded in political discourse. Scheufele (1999:106) formulated this distinction with the terms individual frames and media frames respectively. While the concept of framing refers to subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems; framing effects refers to changes in decision outcomes resulting from these alterations. A framing effect occurs when the frame interacts with cognitive elements within the viewer, activating particular elements over others (Iyengar, 1991:11).

Framing is inherent in the news making process since media cannot offer a mirror reflection of reality but involves selection. The selection of a news "angle" or "storyline" that transforms an occurrence into a news event, and that, in turn, into a news report, is a frame. Cappella and Jamieson (1997:39) defined news frames as: "those rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of the topic treated and are a consistent part of the news environment. News frames may function as both independent and dependent variables. Frames provide meaning and the struggle over news frames is central to every political conflict where each side aims to promote its own perspective. Frame building refers to the process and factors that influence the news frames and more specifically to the interplay between the news making process and the strategies of actors aiming to establish frame dominance. Frame-setting refers to the interaction between media frames and individual's prior knowledge and predispositions (Scheufele 1999).

1.2 FRAMING BY POLITICAL ELITES AND THE NEWSMAKING PROCESS

The framing theory is associated with the hegemonic function of the news. Gitlin (1980) suggests that viewers' conceptions of public events, organizations, and activities are contingent on the frames set by the state and used by the media. Similarly, Zaller (1992) and Edelman (1993) argue that political elites control the framing of issues. For Edelman the framing of issues by societal groups is a result of intentional considerations; he argues that authorities and pressure groups categorize

beliefs in a way that marshals support and opposition to their interests. By using the means of mass media they construct opinions and reality by using their societal influence to establish certain frames of reference.

Analysis of the role of sources in the news making process further explicates this relationship. Sources employ frames and therefore patterns of dominance of sources in the news making process may result to the dominance of the respective frames. Hall et al (1978) introduced the term of primary definers in order to refer to the ability of the official sources to establish ‘the initial definition or the primary interpretation of the topic in question’ (Hall et al 1978:58); while the media reproduce these definitions standing “in position of structured subordination to the primary definers” (Hall et al 1978:59). This theory has been criticized for overstating the passivity of the media, while its monolithic view of the elite fails to account for contestation between official sources in attempting to influence the construction of new stories (Miller 1993, Tumber 2002).

The analysis of patterns of dominance in the frame building process in the realm of foreign policy necessitates the use of more elaborate models. Hallin (1994:11) argues that the behaviour of the media is closely tied to the degree of consensus among political elites. When consensus is strong the media play a relatively passive role and generally reinforce official power to manage public opinion. When political elites are divided, the media become more active and more diverse in the points of view they present. Indexing theory suggests that journalists “tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorial to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennet 1990:106, also Zaller and Chiu 2000).

1.3 INTERPARTY CONFLICT FRAME

The *interparty conflict* frame incorporates varying levels of ideologisation, of personalization, of historical indexing, of intensity of conflict as well as different methods to organize the frame. The qualifying characteristic of this frame is that it perceives and organises reality in a polarized manner and in terms of party-relevance. The position of the parties on different issues organizes media content and potentially their evaluation by the citizens. At the level of mass mediated political reality, the parties are operating as the major (if not the only) credible sources of commentary. The particular frame perpetuates the relevance of the party system in political and social life and organises conflict and disagreement in society across party lines. (Samaras 2000)

The antithetical and conflict element of the *interparty conflict* frame performs the double function of polarising and defining. Often the two poles are defined by

their antithesis. The historical continuity of the bipolar competition that constitutes the political reality of the *interparty conflict frame* results in the historical continuity of the frame itself. The particular frame has been developed as an instrument to analyze the communication aspects of partyocracy in Greece and thus the focus on the party as the structure enacting the frame has been build into the definition (Samaras 2000). In political systems that are in a process of realignment and the dominant ideological polarity is being contested but not totally displaced by emerging alternative polarities, the parties, may also function as contested areas. The structures activating the new polarities tend to be think tanks and group of political actors within the parties or even across parties. This has been the case with the modernist-focus and patriotism-focus interpretative polarities within the context of the Greek political communication system.

In order to appreciate the role of the interparty conflict frame it is necessary to relate it to Hallin's model of the three spheres. Hallin (1986) imagined the journalist world as defined in three regions, each of which is governed by different journalistic standards. Sphere of Consensus: It encompasses those social objects not regarded by the journalists and most of the society as controversial. Within this region journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary journalists serve as advocates.

Sphere of Deviance: The realm of those political actors and views that journalists and the political mainstream of society reject as unworthy or being heard.

Sphere of Legitimate Controversy: This is the area of contest. Within this region objectivity and balance reign as the supreme journalistic values. The limits of this sphere are defined primarily by the party system. The operation of the *interparty conflict frame* places, by definition, an issue with respect to the sphere of legitimate controversy.

Effective mobilization during national crisis or military engagement requires that an issue be placed at the sphere of consensus while alternative interpretations are marginalized into the sphere of deviance. For this to take place the *interparty conflict frame* needs to be deactivated and consent at the level of political elites to emerge. This is evident in the operation of the rally effect in the USA. In the aftermath of major international events involving the US, the president's popularity surges. Typically the surge lasts for about 6 weeks following the president's ratings return to their normal range. This effect occurs even when the event represents a policy failure. This is partly attributed to the fact that when a foreign policy crisis occur politicians of the opposing party typically remain silent or expresses support for the president. The administration's spin on events is thus unchallenged, and the public responds accordingly by supporting the president. If the crisis persists, opposition leaders begin

to contest the president's interpretation. Their rhetoric attracts news coverage and this decrease public support for the administration (Ansolabehere et al. 1993:20). Hallin's research on the news coverage of Vietnam War demonstrates that much of the news discontent during the Vietnam War simply mirrored the emergence of a sustained opposition to administration policies within Congress, and even within the executive branch itself. According to Hallin the causal factor for the break of the American Home Front was not the operation of the media per se but that elite disagreement that reached a high point and thus the hegemonic operation of the media broke down.

The above analysis poses raises certain issues. To what extent and under what conditions is the interparty conflict frame activated during a foreign affairs incidence? What are the rhetorical and actual attributes of a foreign affairs crisis that have the potential to activate or deactivate the interparty conflict frame? What is the framing of foreign news? Does the consensus of political elites result to hegemonic function of the news and consequently to a rally effect at the level of public opinion? Alternatively, is it possible for a bottom-to-top antithesis to emerge even at the face of elite consensus, as it has been the case with the anti-Americanism of the Greek public opinion during the Kosovo crisis?

1.4. FRAMING MOTIVATIONS: THE STRATEGIC FRAME

A frame inherent in the representation of politics is the *strategic* frame. Cappella and Jamieson (Capella and Jamieson 1997:37) define it as: "an organized set of assumptions that implies and often explicitly states that leaders are self-interested at the exclusion of the public good, that their votes can be swayed by monies or special interests, that do not serve their constituents' end, and that they are dishonest about what they are trying to accomplish and driven privately by a desire to stay in power". The qualifying characteristic of this frame is that it perceives and organises (political) activity as a strategic game where the players calculate and pursue strategies to defeat competitors.

The development of strategic framing is related with conceptualising intentionality as a defining attribute of communication in general and political communication in particular. Attribution is constantly and casually attached by almost everybody to every form of political activity. There are two mutually exclusive rationales interpreting the perceived motivation of political activity: the legitimating and the strategic/manipulative rationale. The first considers public statements and acts as being both truthful and accurate representations of the intentions, policy preferences and ideology of the actor. The second rationale considers political actors as manipulators, their statements as propaganda and is constantly in quest of underlying strategic motivation for there every statement or activity. While the first rationale does not challenge the original framing and thus leads to the perpetuation of

the legitimating frames the second rationale produces delegitimizing frames and thus fuels processes of oppositional decoding and counter-framing.

The dominance of *strategic* frame in domestic politics stems from the fact that it conforms to the conventions of news-making more effectively than issue and policy references (Jamieson 1992, Patterson 1993). The *strategic* frame is being generalized from campaigns to governance and discussions of public issues (Cappella and Jamieson 1996:74). The *strategic* frame has been employed in the deconstruction of foreign policy statements and the construction of counter frames. Two main varieties of *strategic* framing have been identified in foreign affairs: *Geo-strategic frame* and *petit-politics frame*. The first deconstructs the high ideals and the normative statements employed in the framing of international decision and policies and reconstruct it in terms of geo-strategic and financial interest According to the *geo-strategic frame* the USA involvement at the Gulf war is explained in term of controlling the Middle East oil, the military engagement in Yugoslavia as an attempt to undermine Russia's potential pillar in the Balkan. The *petit-politics frame* interprets foreign policy decision in terms serving partisan interests or personal strategies of a politician rather than the national issue. According to the *petit-politics frame* USA military engagement in Yugoslavia in 1999 is attributed to the effort of the Clinton administration to survive the Lewinski scandal (Samaras 2002).

The *strategic* frame is important for the management of the home front. The more pervasive a *strategic* frame is in a political communication system, the more cynical the public becomes. This in turn can have negative affects at the mobilization of public opinion and the wider operation of the home front (Samaras 2001).

At the level of international communication the process of *strategic* framing is employed by the participants in an international conflict in the process of constructing 'otherness' by deconstructing the legitimating rhetoric of the opponent. Moreover *strategic* framing is employed in the construction of the meaning of world events when the host country's media due to political and cultural perspectives or geo-strategic rationales develop *Counter* frames to the dominant framing of the event.

In a research examining the frames employed to explain USA administration's motives for the 2003 Iraqi War in the Greek press, a grounded typology was developed. This typology was shaped by the rationales projected by the official US sources, as well as by perspectives that were derived from counterframing in the Greek press. By aggregating the event-specific (or derivative) frames into issue-specific (or generative frames) the following typology emerged: (1) *Legitimizing* frame; high ideals and other legitimating reasons used to justify the event. (2) *Geo-strategic* frame; deconstructs the high ideals employed in the framing of international decision and policies and reconstructs them in terms of geo-strategic interest (3) *Petit-*

politics frame; interprets foreign policy decision in terms serving partisan interests or personal strategies of a politician rather than the national issue. (4) *Vested interests* frame; foreign policy decisions are motivated by the financial interests of the politicians or the entrepreneurs supporting them. (5) *Structural* frame; the activities are due to the internal logic of the system. *Geostrategic*, *petit-politics* and *vested interests* are variations of the strategic framing and are delegitimizing in nature (Samaras 2005).

2. THE EUROPEAN PROSPECT OF TURKEY AS PORTRAYED IN THE GREEK MEDIA

2.1. METHODOLOGY

Both qualitative and quantitative content analyses are employed in this project. The aim is to identify the range of the frames employed and to assess their importance. This raises two major issues: (1) if, and to what extent, the portrayals of the European Prospect of Turkey and in particular the Brussels summit are organized by *conflict* frames and (2) which are the axis around which this conflict is organized? This issue will assist us in investigating the importance of the conflict between Greece and Turkey and whether this has been substituted by other conflicts. In order to answer these questions we have employed bipolar contradistinction as the framing device.

In order to identify the range of the frames employed, a grounded typology was developed. The construction of the grounded typology was based on the analysis of the census of the news items. Categories of the grounded typology were aggregated into wider categories and then the process was repeated. This allowed to move from the issue-specific frames that pertains only specific topics or news events to event-specific frames that transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, over time and in different cultural contexts. The final set of event specific frames were intergraded into the code-book and used for quantitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis allowed also for certain thematic frames to be identified and to be related with the conflict frames.

Four newspapers have been selected for analysis two center-left¹: “Ta Nea” and “Eleftherotypia” and two center-right: “Eleftheros Typos” and “Kathimerini”. The criteria for selection have been that of prominence both in terms of political influence and in terms of circulation. We selected newspapers from both sides of the

¹ The prefix “center” is used in front of the terms Left and Right in order to indicate the gravitation of the Greek political (communication) system (both with respect to the two parties and the press) towards the center and not in order to differentiate these newspapers from others that may be labeled as genuinely Left or Right.

political spectrum in order to examine if press-party parallelism affects media content. In the course of our research we compiled and analysed 444 articles, 75 from “Ta Nea”, 144 from “Eleftherotypia”, 108 from “Kathimerini” and 117 from “Eleftheros Typos”. These articles form a set of all the publications by these newspapers pertaining to the European Prospect of Turkey and were written between the 4th and the 24th of December 2004.

The issues discussed in these articles are centred on the procedures of the Leaders’ Summit of the 17th of December in Brussels, and on particular issues that preoccupy the perpetrators associated with the Summit. These relate to the terms that Turkey will have to fulfil, to its obligation to sign the protocol of customs linkage with the Cypriot Republic, to the issue of the “Aegean shelf” and of Hague; to various economic, human rights (judicial), religious, political, geostrategic, cultural and population-related reasons for the acceptance or rejection of the Turkish European prospect by individual member-states of the E.U.. They also relate to the demands made by Greece and Turkey, to the internal frictions within the E.U. inter- and intra-state and to adscititious factors (e.g. USA), which force or enforce action. The principal concern of this study is the notional ecology of the subject, that is the spectrum of the frames, which are associated with this particular subject.

3.2 TYPOLOGY OF FRAMES

TABLE 1: CATEGORIZATION SYSTEM FOR THE CONTRADICTORY DIPOLES ON WHICH THE CONFLICT IS ORGANIZED

ISSUE /GENERATIVE FRAMES	EVENT /DERIVATIVE FRAMES	FIRST DEGREE GROUNDED CATEGORIZATION*
INTERPARTY GREECE	PASOK – ND KKE-ND Synaspismos-ND	Government – Opposition (ND – PASOK) ND-oriented journalists - Papandreou Diamantopoulou - Government Pasokoriented Journalist - Government Karamanlis - Papandreou Roussopoulos - Papandreou Venizelos - Government Papathelemis-Pasok Simitis - Karamanlis Alavanos - Government KKE –NA
	PATRIARCH - GOVERNMENT	Patriarch entourage – government
INTERPARTY CYPRUS	Proponents – Opponents of the Annan Plan.	ΑΚΕΑ/ΔΗΣΥ- ΔΗΚΟ/ΕΔΕΚ
		ΔΗΚΟ/ΕΔΕΚ/ΑΔΗΚ/New Horizons/Environmentalists – ΔΗΣΥ/ΑΚΕΑ
HELLENISM – TURKEY	CYPRUS – TURKEY	Ertogan - Papadopoulos Ertogan - Cyprus G/C political actors - Turkey Cyprus spokesman – Turkey
	GREECE – TURKEY	Government – Turkish leadership Athens – Angora Greece – Turkey Karamanlis – Ertogan
	PATRIARCHATE – TURKEY	Patriarchate – Turkish Government
EUROPE – TURKEY	FRANCE – TURKEY AUSTRIA – TURKEY EUROPE – TURKEY GERMANY – TURKEY	Τουρκία – Παρίσι
		Τουρκία – Βιέννη Τουρκία -Ε.Ε. Stoiber-Erdogan Γκιούλ- Ευρωπαίοι Ε.Ε. – Οργάνωση Ισλαμικής Διάσκεψης
	GREECE - USA	Κακλαμώνης-ΗΠΑ

ΗΠΑ – ΕΥΡΩΠΗ	ΕΥΡΩΠΗ- ΗΠΑ	Ελλάδα – Η.Π.Α
		Ευρωπαίοι Αριστεροί- ΗΠΑ
USA – TURKEY	USA - TURKEY	ΗΠΑ – Τουρκία
INTERNAL ANTITHESES EUROPE (INTRASTATE)	INTRASTATE FRANCE INTRASTATE GERMANY INTRASTATE ITALY	Γαλλική κοινή γνώμη- Σιράκ
		Χριστιανοδημοκράτες Γερμανίας- Σοσιαλδημοκράτες Γερμανίας
		Λέγκα του Βορρά- Ιταλική κυβέρνηση
		Μπερλουσκόνι- Λέγκα του Βορρά Φεργκόιχεν- έκθεση ΙΜΑΕ Μονάχου
INTERNAL ANTITHESES EUROPE (INTERSTATE)	PRO-TURKEY – “TURKEY-SKEPTICS”	Γερμανία/Αγγλία/Ιταλία-
		Γαλλία/Αυστρία /Δανία
		Βρετανία/ Ιταλία/ Λουξεμβούργο – Γαλλία/ Αυστρία/ χώρες «τουρκοσκεπτικισμού»
		Υποστηρικτές ένταξης- «τουρκοσκεπτικιστές»
		Αυτοί που προωθούν την πολιτική ενοποίηση της Ε.Ε. – αυτοί που θέλουν την Ε.Ε. μια χαλαρή κοινή αγορά
		Blair - Papadopoulos
INTERNAL ANTITHESES TURKEY	KURDS - TURKS	Kurds – Angora
		Ertogan – Agar
		Ertogan – liberal Turkish leaders
		Muslims – Kemal followers
		Nationalist Turks – Kemal Followers/ Muslims – Pro-European Turks
	GREAT BRITAIN – CYPRUS	Great Britain / Italy / Luxemburg – France / Austria – other “turkey- skeptic” countries

2.2.1 Greek-Turkish Conflict Frame

The principal reference point in the construction of the representation of the European Prospect of Turkey during the interval between the 4th and the 24th of December is the stance of Greece, but more importantly of Cyprus with respect to Turkey. The main conflict-generating axis in all the newspapers is the prospect of Turkey, initially, recognizing the Cypriot Republic, which then is transformed to the prospect of the signing of the customs-linkage between Turkey and Cyprus. Greece is portrayed by the press, mainly the opposition press (“Ta Nea”, “Eleftherotypia”), to follow a secondary, subordinate policy, that of supporting the Cypriot Republic, while the Cypriot Republic, on the other hand, plays a more active role in the conflict. The dominant conflict frame that organizes the content of the articles is the dipole “Cyprus-Turkey”, while the Greek government plays a secondary role, assisting the advancement of the conflict.

We ought to point out that during this particular time, the articles focus on the terms and the conditions of rapprochement for Turkey, on the constraints that will be imposed by the E.U. and whether the Turkish side would accept them. This happens since the Leaders’ Summit is far too near and, thus, what interests the most are the decisions and their parameters. The points of reference of those who wish and those who wish not for Turkey to become a member – state of the E.U. are overshadowed in this manner, since they are considered to be more or less known. In “Kathimerini” we find most of the articles that discuss the identity of Turkey and whether or not it belongs to the European family, on a more philosophical level than on other newspapers.

It must be said that the press, following the politicians, is not negative towards the European Prospect of Turkey but demands certain terms and conditions to be met. The strategy of managing the discord between the Greek expectations and the Turkish behavior is a very important feature for constructing the hermeneutic frames. Thus, in almost all the articles, reference is being made to the almost de facto recognition of the Cypriot Republic and the relegation of the “Aegean shelf” to the International Court of Hague, and also to the extension of the Greek dominion in accordance with the 12 nautical miles. Then “recognition” becomes “signing”, meaning the signing of the expansion of the customs linkage between Turkey and the ten new member states of the E.U., including Cyprus.

The publications of these 20-odd days under scrutiny, usually discuss to the measures and actions of the government on the road to the Summit, Greece’s and Cyprus’ demands against Turkey and the conflict between the Greek and the Turkish side with regard to the conditions and final clauses in the conclusions text to be published. The slide of the content of the terms, which continuously lessen, is

characteristic. The discourse produced by the Greek political communication system is characterized by elements such as rationalizations, the mutation of semiotics, the transposition of objectives and the deduction of the cost of a change of strategy. These elements exhibit that the dominant consideration in these articles, organized by the conflict-generating dipole of Greece and Turkey, is not so much the accomplish the confrontation with Turkey but, rather, to manage the Home Front and to maintain the master frame.

Patriarch Bartholomew is portrayed as conciliatory and positive with respect to Turkey's European Prospect, although demanding that Turkey recognizes the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate. This is the element that constructs the dipole of a conflict-generating confrontation – hermeneutic frame between himself and Turkish state policy, but also between himself and the Greek policy, which, he feels, is not insistent enough with regard to the interests of the Holy Throne. Patriarch Bartholomew, as a conflict pole and a player, appears more frequently in newspapers close to the party in power.

The conflict-generating dipole of Greece and Turkey is also fed by articles that refer to violations of Greek national air and sea space by the Turks. These articles are usually entitled “But the provocations never cease...”², “New provocations, airborne and on the water”³, “The Turks enter the E.U. through Imia”⁴, “Turkish provocation at Imia”⁵, “Provocations”⁶, “6 Instigations”⁷, “Continuous Provocations”⁸, “They came within 200meters of Imia again”⁹, “Turkish unarmed provocations...”¹⁰. The “provocations” and the “intrusions” both as a matter of fact and as a hermeneutic frame challenge the basic assumptions underlying the Greek strategy, that the European Perspective of Turkey will lessen its aggressiveness. While the headlines very often counterframe the Greek strategy, the writing style and the importance attributed to these “intrusions” reduce them to an “everyday sport for the Turks” with Greece “sitting with its hands crossed”.

² «ΑΙΓΑΙΟ: Πάντως οι προκλήσεις δεν σταματούν...», *Ελεύθερος Τύπος*, Παρασκευή 17 Δεκεμβρίου 2004, σ.σ.5.

³ «Νέες προκλήσεις από αέρα και θάλασσα», *Ελεύθερος Τύπος*, Τετάρτη 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2004, σ.σ.4 .

⁴ «Οι Τούρκοι μπαίνουν στην Ε.Ε. από τα Ίμια», *Ελευθεροτυπία*, Τετάρτη 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2004.

⁵ Γιώργος Μαλούχος, «Τουρκική πρόκληση στα Ίμια», *Καθημερινή*, Τετάρτη 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2004.

⁶ Υπότιτλος στο άρθρο της Ειρήνης Καρανασοπούλου, «Σχέδιο με... υφαλοκρηπίδα», *Τα Νέα*, 8 Δεκεμβρίου 2004, σ.σ. 12.

⁷ Υπότιτλος στο άρθρο της Ειρήνης Καρανασοπούλου, «'Βέτο' βάζουν οι Ευρωπαίοι», *Τα Νέα*, 14 Δεκεμβρίου 2004.

⁸ Υπότιτλος στο άρθρο Ε.Καρανασοπούλου, Γ.Τσαλάκος, Φ.Στάγκος, «Φόρμουλα για την Κύπρο», *Τα Νέα*, 16 Δεκεμβρίου 2004, σ.σ. 16

⁹ Λουκάς Δημάκας, «Στα 200ν μέτρα πλησίασαν πάλι τα Ίμια», *Τα Νέα*, 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2004.

¹⁰ «Τουρκικές παραβιάσεις χωρίς οπλισμό...», *Ελευθεροτυπία*, Παρασκευή 17 Δεκεμβρίου 2004.

Usually these publications are single column and short and the way they are presented may be incorporated in a *acceptance/tolerance* frame by the Greek state. In terms of framing the particular news stories have an inherent quality for counterframing and this poses the dilemma of a strategy of paradigm shift Vs a strategy of paradigm maintenance. Through the appositive use of “intrusions”, which do not negate Greece’s strategic decisions the paradigm (master frame) is maintained.

2.2.2. Interparty Conflict Frame

The Greek government asserts that it will assist and support the decisions taken by Nicosia, retracting in this way the burden of responsibility from Greece and transferring it to Cyprus. This makes the relation between the policies of Greece and Cyprus the focal point, an concern that dominated the public agenda in Greece during the campaign for the Annan Plan referendum in Cyprus, that took place six months earlier. The first phase of the operation of the interparty frame is related to this matter and is, in essence, a repeat of the previous conflict.

During the campaign for the Annan Plan referendum in Cyprus PASOK President George Papandreou tried to influence the Greek Cypriots towards voting in favor of the Plan. He argued that the Greek Cypriots should not decide by themselves but integrate the interests of Greece in their decisions since a ‘No’ to the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots would hinder the developing relations between Greece and Turkey and would hurt the international image of Greece. Thus he in effect was requesting the Greek administration to become a lever for the international pressures to the Greek Cypriot public opinion to accept the plan., while he undermined the most important dogma in the Greek-Cyprus relations for the past 30 years codified as: “Cyprus decides – Greece supports”. Prime Minister Karamanlis in his statement of April 15 was indirectly but clearly in favor of the Annan Plan. It is important to note that this statement was made a week after Papadopoulos’ television address, when public opinion in Cyprus had been crystallized in its opposition against the Plan. His statement, while in support of the Plan, undermined many of the fear appeals related with its negation. Karamanlis stressed that the Greek government would be at the side of the Greek Cypriots whatever their decision at the referendum. Finally he refuted Papandreou’s main argument by stating that no one should view the free expression of the will of the Cypriot people as a condition or a hindrance to the developing ties of friendship between Greece and Turkey (Samaras and Kendas 2005). Papandreou constantly reinterpreted Karamanli’s position in terms of “akwardness” and “ineptitude”. With respect to the Brussels’ Summit and the possibility of a Cypriot veto to the Turkish application, the government of Nea Demokratia supported the policy “Cyprus decides – Greece supports” while Papandreou actively challenged it.

It is noteworthy that while the government aimed to place the issue within the sphere of consensus, while PASOK by activating the interparty conflict frame seek to place it to the sphere of legitimate controversy. This attempt by the government triggers a notional ecology typical of the rhetorical aspect of the rally-around-the-flag effect. We shall term it as *national frame/frame of the agreement*. This frame is realized within references to national issues and the national strategy, the absence of polarized communication while it gains support from an “all together” rhetoric, in order to strengthen its strategy and relief all contestations. PASOK in effect employed the *interparty frame* in order to counterframe the *national frame*. Thus the polarizing and defining aspects of the *interparty frame* were instrumentally actualized to the benefit of PASOK. ND responded to PASOK’s counterframing mainly by sticking to the *national frame* while at the same time it employed a metacommunication narrative based on the *petit-political* variety of the *strategic frame* in order to deconstruct PASOK intentions.

The second phase of the operation of the *interparty conflict frame* is related with the blame game that took place after the Brussels’ Summit. Blame games are the ritualistic processes of attribution of responsibility performed after a failure or crisis. Inherent in a blame game is the definition of a situation as a failure. The outcome of the Summit does not function self-evidently as a failure and this inaugurates a process of terministic control over the meaning of the outcome. As a side effect of this process, the meaning and implications of the Helsinki Summit underwent a process of reinterpretation and become the arena of strong symbolic conflict. The discourse produced by the blame game is build around the code words «Helsinki - Brussels». The pro-government press “Eleftheros Typos” and “Kathimerini” proclaim Greece’s strategy at Brussels as “victorious” and as the strategy that put an end to the compliance of the Simitis’ administration at Helsinki in 1999, while the opposition press speak of the betrayal of the Helsinki accomplishments and accuse the Karamanlis’ administration of being compliant at Brussels. In the context of this particular discourse “compliance” stands for “managerial capability” and, thus, it does not effectively challenge the dominant master frame.

Two features are noteworthy: (a) there is strong, but not total, press-party parallelism. The dominant frame employed by the newspapers is that of the party they support but they do not exclude sources with a different perspective; (b) within the context of this particular discourse, the national strategy regarding Turkey is treated as a valence rather than as position issue¹¹. The blame game focuses on who can

¹¹ A position issue is one on which the rival parties reach out for the support of the electorate by taking different positions on a policy question in ways that divide the electorate, while valence issues are the issues used by parties and candidates to link themselves in the voters minds with conditions, goals, or symbols that are universally approved or disapproved by the electorate (Stokes/Dilulio 1993:6-7)

pursue the policy more efficiently and effectively. Although reality, in the form of the Turkish implacability, challenges this strategy and leads to strong criticism within the Greek political system and media, it does not lead to the rapture of the dominant master frame.

2.2.3. EU-Related Conflict Frames

The image of the European Prospect of Turkey is portrayed by reference to various frictions in such a manner as to paint a most vivid picture of the climate of uncertainty and doubt dominant within the EU. The EU-related conflicts include the conflicts between European actors and Turkey actors but also those that occur within the Union and relate to the European Prospect of Turkey. In the EU-related conflict there are three levels of actors involved: Intrastate (e.g. parties, organizations, public opinion), state, international. The organization of contrapositions does not limit itself to factors of any level. The prospect of accession for Turkey raises issues regarding the identity and the content of the Union itself. This produces contrasts and coiling on an Inter-European level. The appearance of Inter-European coiling may be regarded as marking the creation and activation of an EU public sphere.

On the level of thematic frames we may record a series of event-specific frames as stemming from our qualitative research: the frame of *cultural capture*, the frame of a *Christian Europe*, the frame relating to *cost of the enlargement*, and the frame of the *population giant*. These frames produce fear appeals and function in a counter-justification manner with respect to Turkey's European Prospect. Justification for this cause is offered by the frame of the *enlarged market*, which portrays the European Prospect in terms of economic opportunities.

On the level of the conflict-generating dipoles which function as dividing incisions one major focal point is provided by the conflicts in Germany between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats/Greens, since the former seek a special preferential relation to Turkey, while the second wish for its full accession. The first pole focuses on mainly religious, cultural and population related issues, while the other pole focuses on party interests (since a great percentage of their voters are Germans of Turkish origins), but also on economic interests, since Turkey procures much of its arms from Germany. Thus the petit political frame and the geostrategic frame are employed to delegitimize the German governments' support to Turkey.

Respectively, the conflict between president Shirac and the French public opinion is dominant in France, since the French president looks to the geopolitical interests of Europe in Asia and the communication between the West and the Muslim world, while the French public opinion is afraid of the population pressure and the

economic, cultural and political ramifications stemming from a potential accession of Turkey, both with respect to the greater European sphere, but also with respect to France's own internal affairs. In Italy, the Northern League clashes with Berlusconi's administration for similar reasons, while in Austria we witness a consensus to reject the Turkish accession and to support a special privileged relation with the neighbouring country. The English are being portrayed as the most fanatic in their support of Turkey's European Prospects. The reasons brought forth are mainly economic. In addition, geopolitical interests, they claim, are also catered, since Turkey is a key NATO ally, both with respect to the alliance's operations in the greater Anatolia region, and also for the operation of the Inzirlic military base.

In this particular discourse, Great Britain identifies with the USA in their support for Turkey's European Prospect and, thus, while Great Britain is part of the European being, it comes down in a different sphere with reference to the underlying conflict between Europe and the USA. The USA appears to be systematically exercising pressure to Balkenende's Dutch Presidency, for an unconditional acceptance of the Turkish accession. They support that Turkey's E.U. membership is compatible with the objective of political stability in the Middle East. The economic and sociopolitical impact of the presence of EU in the Middle East through such a key player as Turkey, and the example set by the continuous changes in Turkey, so as to comply with all the accession criteria, will ultimately serve the objective for the stabilization of the Middle East.

The USA justify their standpoint through references to higher values, such as the stabilization of the Middle East, the consolidation of democracy but also the reference to religious values. Their legitimating frame employs a justification basis that merges normative considerations with a geostrategic perspective. This leads us to enrich our initial typology of frames with one more, the *normative geopolitical* frame. Like the geostrategic frame, it employs as a hermeneutic base the geopolitical element but instead of incorporating it in a strategic perspective it merges it with normative considerations. Therefore the overall instrumental actualization of the particular frame is legitimating.

US motivations are countered-framed by geostrategic frame. The acclamation is that the USA aims at the impoverishment of Europe by Turkey's accession to the Union, so as to avoid a future new balance of power and the transmutation of the present unipolar global system, which is controlled by them.

An important attribute of the discourse on the EU-USA relations is the *dependence/hetero-determination* frame. An essential attribute of this frame is that Europe as a whole and as the individual member states and leaderships is hetero-

determined and depends on the USA. This frame is at play on three different levels of relations: the USA-Europe Relation, the USA-Individual European States Relation and, finally, the USA-Political Leaderships (Blair) Relation. It coexists with the *frailty/inadequacy frame* of the E.U. relating to defense and foreign policy. The *dependence/hetero-determination* frame must be examined should the reality of the phenomenon produce a notional ecology with stable characteristics: code words, metaphors, framing devices. But what are the political events that fuel it? What are the news items generating it? An important point is being raised and one that deserves further research, namely the image of the USA-Europe relations in the discourse of the European Integration. The code words enacting this frame also relate to images of USA imperialism, endemic in the Greek media (Gialourides and Kefala 2001, Samaras 2005)

2.3 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION

TABLE 2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR BASIC DIVISIONAL INCISIONS

GREEK INTERPARTY	32 – 12%
CYPRIOI INTERPARTY	15 – 05%
HELLENISM – TURKEY	131 – 48%
EUROPE – TURKEY	18 – 07%
USA - TURKEY	1 – 00%
EUROPE – USA	6 – 02%
INTERNAL CONTRAPOSITIONS IN EUROPE (INTRA-STATE)	28 – 10%
INTERNAL CONTRAPOSITIONS IN EUROPE (INTER-STATE)	27 – 10%
INTERNAL CONTRAPOSITIONS TURKEY	15 – 05%
ARTICLES CONTAINING A CONTRAPOSITIONAL DIPOLE	273 (61%) (THIS FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE CATEGORY PERCENTAGES)
ARTICLES WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN A CONTRAPOSITIONAL DIPOLE	171 (39%)
TOTAL ARTICLES	444

Conflict frames 273 out of 444 articles. These form the basis of the analysis. Most of these articles are organized by the Hellenism – Turkey conflict. The weight of this conflict is born principally by Cyprus not Greece. The principal issue raised by the Greek Press pertains to the signing of the protocol for the customs linkage between Turkey and Cyprus, with 85 articles (31%). Greece is presented as a confrontation pole for Turkey in 13,2% of the articles.

An important portion of the conflict (29% of the articles) relates to the European Union. The employment of the conflict frame with respect to the EU, is fueled principally by internal EU dynamics. 20% is framed by antitheses internal to the EU. Turkey's European Prospects have evidently led to the mobilization of the

European public sphere, as is demonstrated by the fact that half of the antitheses (10%) relate to the intrastate level, while the other half (10%) relate to the interstate level. The Europe-Turkey conflict dominates only 7% of the articles, while the Europe-USA conflict only 2%. Limited exposure is given to the issue whether a large part of the USA position is carried through by Great Britain.

The intraparty conflict frame with reference point the party system of Greece dominates 12% of the articles, while that of Cyprus 5%. The ND-PASOK conflict is presented as being important, while references, on the other hand, to the interparty conflict in Cyprus, which is far more intense, and bears on the modulation of policies, since Cyprus is called upon to transact most of the conflict with Turkey, are bare minimal. This might be attributed to the ethnocentric function of the Greek Press.

Respective conflict-generating frames are also evident in Turkey's home front with 15 articles (5%) addressing this issue, formed on the basis of the Muslim/Pro-European, Kemalist/Military Status Quo conflict, which is present in 80% of the references made to conflicts within Turkey, while the frame of the conflict between Ertogan and other leaders is referenced to by only 13% and the conflict frame of the Kurds and the Turks is referenced by only 7% of the conflicts within Turkey.

In conclusion, this paper demonstrates the use of the bipolar contradistinction as a research instrument in the examination of the degree of disassociation of the image of Greece from the *conflict frame* with respect to Turkey. The research instrument presented in this paper can be employed in examination of the disassociation process at both the levels of Greece's nation image making in the international media and of the Greek home front. As it has been demonstrated in this paper the representations of the European Prospect of Turkey as they are formed in relation to key incidents is the appropriate field for such research to be conducted since it allows to examine the importance of Greece Vs Turkey contradistinction in relation to alternative ones. In the present study while the use of contenting strategy by Turkey results to an extensive use of the conflict frame (48%) this is organized predominantly by the Cyprus Vs Turkey contradistinction. Thus to the initial question on the success of the process of disassociation the answer is affirmative. It has to be stated, however, that this is not due to the lack of conflict but due to the operation of the dominant master frame. For the data in this study to be appropriately interpreted further cross-national research needs to be undertaken. Moreover, at it becomes clear from this study the dominant master frame in the Greek-Turkish relation and in the perception of Turkey needs to be in-depth examined.

APPENDIX: THE HELSINKI LEADERS SUMMIT: TURKEY CANDIDATE FOR ACCESSION

The Helsinki Summit in Finland on the 9, 10 and 11 of December 1999, specified the framework of the Greek-Turkish relations, but also laid out the future prospects of Europe for political unification, to the extent that it stigmatized the international role of the EU in the emerging international political horizon. In addition it set the boundaries for the ideological, institutional and strategic relation of Europe to its trans-Atlantic agent, offering the general framework within which the decisions of our partners in the fields of the Common Foreign Policy and Defense Policy are to be taken. It also alludes to the “in the future” development of a Common European Defense. The role of Turkey in the EU was geopolically upgraded, since Turkey would have, on the one hand, the capability of contributing military personnel and recourses to crisis management and, on the other hand, would be deprived of the opportunity to be involved in Union Programs and Organizations, or Assemblies and Negotiations between Candidate Countries and the Union in the course of their accession to the Union. The European Council also decided to begin the accession talks with Romania, Slovakia, Leetonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE LEADERS SUMMIT OF THE 17th OF DECEMBER THAT REGARD TURKEY

According to the resolutions published by the Dutch Presidency after delegation with the member states of the EU, the EU decided to: begin the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU on the 3rd of October 2005. The main part of the negotiation will take place in a Inter-Governmental Summit, where all the member states will be present. Unison is required for decision making, while the option of long transitional periods, divergences, special regulations or permanent indemnity quotas in sectors such as the free movement of persons, the structural reformations or agriculture is under discussion. Especially with respect to the free movement of persons, the role of the member states in the final decision is recognized as cardinal. The prospective accession of Turkey in the EU is thought to happen sometime after 2014. The accession procedure is open and its outcome may not be foreseen. The possibility of failure in the negotiations is also addressed and the binding of Turkey to the European structures in the securest way is proposed as a countermeasure.

Furthermore, there is a clause for the respite of the negotiations, according to which, the commission, acting on its own initiative or following an request by 1/3 of its members, will commend a respite of the talks in the case of a serious and continuous infringement of the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the lawful state. There is also talk about showing zero tolerance against torture and mal-treatment. Turkey commits itself to good neighboring relations and to cooperate towards the resolution of outstanding border differences, under the principles of peaceful settlement of disagreements according to the UN Chart.

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