

## **Analysis of the Cyprus referendum on the Annan plan**

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### **Abstract**

One of the most important worldwide political issues in 2004 has emerged at 24 April 2004. Cypriots have expressed their opinion about the well-known Annan plan on the reunification of Cyprus in two simultaneous referenda.

In this paper we analyse how the Greek Cypriots voted in the referendum. Firstly, we present the Cypriots' attitudes towards the Annan plan and the general political scene. For many Greek Cypriots the Annan plan had a lot of disadvantages and most of the Greek Cypriot political parties were against the plan. Some Greek Cypriot political leaders also influenced the Greek Cypriot vote by strongly opposing the plan.

Our analysis shows that Greek Cypriots have not voted uniformly on the Annan Plan. Their vote is strongly depended on their political ideas and theses. For instance, more than 90% of the Cyprus President supporters voted against the Annan Plan. On the other hand, the percentage of those who voted against the Annan plan among the voters of the rest candidates for the 2003 presidential elections is lower.

Another important factor for the vote seems to be the voters' geographical location. Spatial differences seem to be very important in Cyprus referendum. For instance, a comparison between Paphos and Famagusta Districts provides enough evidence for the importance of spatial factors. Spatial differences in the Cyprus referendum results are explored using ecological inference techniques.

In less than two months time, after the referendum, Cypriots voted for their first time to elect six European Parliament members. An important question that arises under these conditions is related to how much the referendum results affected the Cypriots' attitudes in these elections. Some answers are given with the use of ecological inference techniques.

### **Introduction**

One of the most important worldwide political issues in 2004 has emerged on the 24th of April 2004. Cypriots have expressed their opinion about the well-known Annan plan on the reunification of Cyprus in two simultaneous referenda.

For the analysis of the results someone needs to understand the Cyprus political status at that time: the power of the Cypriot political parties, their attitudes towards the Annan plan and the general political scene.

In the first section the general political scene at the time of the referendum is presented as well as the national authorities (the President and the House of Representatives), the political parties and their power, the political leaders and their attitudes towards the Annan plan.

In the second section an analysis of the referendum results is presented. The analysis indicates that an important part of Greek Cypriots have voted against to what the leaders of their favourite political parties or their favourite president had proposed.

In the third section we deal with how much the referendum results affected the Cypriots' attitudes in the elections for the European Parliament that took place in less than two months time after the referendum. The analysis indicates that the candidates of the political parties, which supported the Annan plan, have suffered of a significant loss of power in comparison to the results of previous elections.

## **1. Cyprus Political Scene**

### *President and House of Representatives*

There are two types of national elections taking place in the Republic of Cyprus: the presidential and the legislative elections. The candidate who gathers more than 50% of the valid votes in the presidential elections is elected as President (the Head of State) of Cyprus for a five year term. The House of Representatives is also elected for a five year term through the legislative elections. The House of Representatives consists of 80 seats. 56 of these members are elected by the Greek Cypriot Community by proportional representation and the 24 seats are allocated to the Turkish community but remain empty.

Cyprus has a presidential system. Government may not include members of the House of Representatives. Members of the House of Representatives, who are appointed by the President to become Ministers, must relinquish their seats in the House of Representatives. The President of the Republic has the right to interpose his veto on any law concerning the issues of foreign affairs, defence and security.

### *Political Parties Power*

Cyprus has a multi-party system. At the time of referendum there were three strong parties that represent more than 80% of the electorate. Progressive Party of Working People is a member of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left in the European Parliament. Democratic Party is a centrist political party and is led by Tassos Papadopoulos, the current President of Cyprus. Democratic Rally is a conservative political party and a member of European People's Party in the European Parliament. At the referendum time there were eight political parties with seats in the House of Representatives. These parties are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Cyprus House of Representatives election results (27 May 2001)**

<b>Parties</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Seats</b>
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	142648	34.71%	20
Democratic Rally (DISY)	139721	34.00%	19
Democratic Party (DIKO)	60986	14.84%	9
Movement for Social Democracy - United Democratic Union of Centre (EDEK)	26767	6.51%	4
New Horizons (NEO)	12333	3.00%	1
United Democrats (EDH)	10635	2.59%	1
Fighting Democratic Movement (ADHK)	8860	2.16%	1
Ecological and Environmental Movement (OIKO)	8129	1.98%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>410987</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>56</b>

*Cyprus President*

The current Cyprus President, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected on the 16<sup>th</sup> of February 2003 winning Glafcos Clerides, who had served as President for 10 years after winning the presidential elections in 1993 and in 1998, on the first round. Tassos Papadopoulos won the 2003 presidential elections with a campaign based on his claims that he would achieve a better deal over the Cyprus dispute than Glafcos Clerides.

Clerides was backed up by his own party, Democratic Rally, and two other political parties i.e. United Democrats and Fighting Democratic Movement. On the other hand, he had to deal with the inner party issue of the attorney general Alekos Markides who disagreed with his party and ran as an independent candidate.

Papadopoulos was supported by Democratic Party, Progressive Party of Working People, Ecological and Environmental Movement and Movement for Social Democracy - United Democratic Union of Centre. The latter party joined the coalition after his leader lost the initial Democratic Rally support as a candidate.

**Table 2. Cyprus Presidential election results (16 February 2003)**

<b>Candidates</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>%</b>
Tassos Papadopoulos	213353	51.51%
Glafcos Clerides	160724	38.80%
Alekos Markides	27404	6.62%
Others	12712	3.07%
<b>Total</b>	<b>414193</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Finally, there were seven other candidates including Nikos Koutsou who was backed up by his political party New Horizons. The presidential election results are presented

in Table 2.

*Attitudes towards the Annan plan*

For many Greek Cypriots the Annan plan had a lot of disadvantages<sup>1</sup>: The plan was excessively oriented towards a bi-zonal situation in the sense of creating permanent ethnic and legal separation<sup>2</sup>. The central government would be weak and both political entities would enjoy extensive local autonomy. The plan did not contain ironclad provisions for the implementation of the agreement and the security of Greek Cypriots. Instead, it contained provisions for Turkish troops to remain on the island for some time after a settlement would come into force. Greek Cypriots were not satisfied as far as the Turkish settlers and the return of refugees to their properties were concerned.

Finally, the Annan plan was modified on core issues and it was continuously revised to address last-minute amendments by the Turkish Cypriots; this was giving the impression that people were being asked to vote on something they had not even seen: *“On 29 March 2004, the UN Secretary General presented a revised version of his plan, containing numerous amendments, including changes on core issues and reopening substantial trade-offs, previously agreed, and requested the comments of the parties within less than 24 hours. In addition to the Foundation Agreement, the revised version consisted of over 9000 pages, including 131 laws, covering, for example, the important issues of citizenship / settlers, the Federal Central Bank, international treaties, etc.”*<sup>3</sup>

Political leaders also influenced the Greek Cypriot vote by strongly opposing the plan. Tassos Papadopoulos, president of the Republic of Cyprus, in a speech delivered on the 7<sup>th</sup> of April live on television called on Greek Cypriots to reject the plan, declaring *“I received a state; I will not deliver a community”*. The Progressive Party of Working People firstly requested the postponement of the referendums and two days before the referendums they decided to reject the Annan Plan because it did not provide sufficient security guarantees. The Movement for Social Democracy - United Democratic Union of Centre, New Horizons, Fighting Democratic Movement and Ecological and Environmental Movement also opposed the plan. Finally, some members of Democratic Rally split from the party and formed a new party named *“For Europe”* which opposed the plan as well.

Endorsement of the plan was voiced by Democratic Rally leadership and the United Democrats. Glafcos Clerides also supported the plan: *“I am 85 years old”*, said the former President of the Republic, *“I would rather pass away, than seeing the end of fights of the Cypriot people”*<sup>4</sup>.

## 2. Referendum Analysis

### *Referendum results*

The question the electorate faced on decision day was as follows: “*Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the law to be in force to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European united?*”

The referendum results are displayed in Table 3.

**Table 3. Cyprus Referenda results (24 April 2004)**

<b>Electorate</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Greek Cypriots	24.17%	75.83%
Turkish Cypriots	64.90%	35.09%

Data in Table 3 show that the Annan plan was accepted by about two thirds of the Turkish Cypriot electorate and by only one out of four Greek Cypriot voters. This resounding rejection of the plan among Greek Cypriots was the result of a general perception that the Annan Plan was unbalanced and unfair to Greek Cypriots.

### Analysis of the Greek Cypriots vote

Analysis of the Greek Cypriots vote has been offered by exit polls conducted on the day of the referenda, and other opinion polls conducted at that time<sup>5</sup>. For instance, Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay reports: “*these polls have indicated that the rejection of the reunification proposal was particularly strong among the younger generation in the Greek Cypriot community*”<sup>6</sup> and she comments that this finding fits with the very active and vocal participation of young voters to the pre-referendum no-campaign.

The national surveys with random interviews of isolated individuals can provide useful information on nationwide characteristics of Greek Cypriots vote but the geographic component of the results is ignored. For instance, Cyprus is divided in 6 districts: Paphos, Limassol, Larnaca, Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta. Paphos and Limassol Districts are the only districts that are controlled by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus. Kyrenia is the smallest district of Cyprus, and it has been occupied by the Turkish army since 1974. The rest three districts are divided by the Green Line. The northern part of Nicosia District, a small part of Larnaca District and the vast majority of Famagusta District have been occupied by the Turkish army since 1974. From exit poll results we have some idea about the percentage of voters who voted “NO” from the supporters of each political party in nationwide level, but we do not know how this percentage varies in each district.

The ecological inference problem could be described with Table 4.

**Table 4. Presidential - Referendum results**

	No	Yes
Papadopoulos	$B^b$	51,51%
Other		48.49%
	75.83%	24.17%

The unknown quantity  $B^b$  represents the percentage of Papadopoulos' voters who voted NO at the referendum. Using the inequalities known in the literature as the method of bounds,  $B^b$  could have any value in the range [53.08%, 100%] without contradicting its row and column sums. Thus, additional information should be used to narrow the range of  $B^b$ . For instance, additional information is available for Nicosia Municipality. The additional data are presented in Table 5.


**Table 5. Presidential - Referendum results in Nicosia Municipality**

	No	Yes
Papadopoulos	$b_i^b$	46.88%
Other	$b_i^w$	53.12%
	70.20%	29.80%

For Cyprus the election results are available for 334 units (municipalities and communities). The application of the deterministic information from the method of bounds to these 334 units provides very substantial improvements on the estimation of  $b_i^b$  (the percentage of Papadopoulos' voters who voted "NO") and  $b_i^w$  (the percentage of voters who have not voted Papadopoulos for President and who voted "NO") in the  $i$  unit. By treating each unit in isolation, we use all available information to give a range of possible values for each  $b_i^b$  and  $b_i^w$  for  $i=1, 2, \dots, 334$ . This information is presented in a plot named tomography plot. Then, we use King's statistical model<sup>7</sup> that uses the information from all the other units in the data set to give the probable location of each true  $b_i^b$  within its known deterministic bounds.

The tomography plot for the total of the 334 units is presented in Diagram 1. Each line corresponds to one unit and traces out all possible pairs of values  $b_i^b$  and  $b_i^w$ . This data summary is useful for the interpretation of the data. Looking at Diagram 1, someone would expect that the unknown value of  $B^b$  should be located nearest to 1 than to 0. With King's method we can fit a truncated bivariate normal distribution to the data and using this fitted distribution we can estimate a posterior distribution of the unknown quantities for each unit.

**Diagram 1 Tomography plot: Papadopoulos voters and NO voters**



**Map 1 Papadopoulos' voters rejecting Annan plan in each district**



With this method we are able to estimate  $b_i^b$  i.e. the percentage of Papadopoulos' voters who voted "NO" in each of the 334 units, and  $B_i^b$  i.e. the percentage of Papadopoulos' voters who voted "NO" in total. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.905. This means that 90.5% of Papadopoulos' voters agreed with their President on rejecting the Annan plan. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 1.

Using King's method we estimate the percentage of Clerides' voters who voted "YES" in total. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.329. This means that 32.9% of Clerides' voters agreed with their preferred candidate for President and they approved the Annan plan. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 2.

**Map 2 Clerides' voters approving Annan plan in each district**



From the results presented in Maps 1-2 it seems that the rejection of the Annan plan was partly influenced by the political leaders and their campaigns but it was also relevant to spatial differences among the Cyprus districts. Greek Cypriots have not followed their leaders with the same way in each district. Famagusta citizens are those who present the smaller percentages of rejection. On the other hand, Paphos citizens are those who rejected the plan with greater strength.

### 3. European Parliament Elections

In this section ecological inference methods are used to estimate the voting behaviour of Clerides' and Papadopoulos' supporters in the European Parliament elections. The



results are compared to the results of the second section and some useful conclusions for the role of the referendum in the European Parliament elections are drawn.

*Main issues and results*

European parliamentary elections had been held on the 13<sup>th</sup> of June 2004, just six weeks after the referendum. For the first time Cypriots voted to elect European Parliament member and to complete Cyprus accession to the European Union. 59 candidates were contested for six seats. Nine parties or party coalitions tried to elect their candidates to the European Parliament, in addition to seven individual candidates.

Tensions were still high following the extremely acrimonious debate over the UN plan. When President Papadopoulos was asked how the referendum would affect the results of the elections for the European Parliament he answered: *"It is not possible to ignore the expressed will of the people in the referendum but on the other hand it cannot be the sole determining factor because there are many European issues concerning the EU, very important issues, such as the Constitution and the future course of Europe, in which I believe Cyprus must have a voice and a role."*<sup>8</sup>

The role of the referendum on the Annan plan is also revealed by the participation of the coalition "For Europe" in the European Parliament election. This coalition was formed as a successor of a movement under Yiannakis Matsis, former president of the Democratic Rally party and one of its founding members. The main target of this coalition was to collect the votes of those DISY supporters who had rejected the Annan plan in the referendum.

Another issue with the European Parliament elections was the percentage of abstention. Almost every political leader was concerned about this issue and tried to motivate the supporters of their party to participate. Their concerns are obvious from their statements at the elections day:

Democratic Rally President Nicos Anastasiades: "Let everyone honour with their presence this day of celebration for Europe because today is also a day of celebration for Cyprus and for democracy ... everyone's presence is necessary."

Cyprus President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos: "it is natural, it is not a phenomenon unique to Cyprus ... I hope that the percentage of Cypriot citizens voting today will be higher than that in other European countries"

General Secretary of AKEL and House of Representatives President Demetris Christofias: "I call the people of Cyprus to proceed to the

polling stations to vote and not show indifference ... even the limited number of European Parliament members can play their own role in promoting a solution of the Cyprus problem"<sup>9</sup>.

In Table 6 the results of the European Parliament elections are presented.

**Table 6. Cyprus European Parliament elections results (13 June 2006)**


<b>Parties</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Seats</b>
Democratic Rally (DISY)	94355	28.23%	2
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	93212	27.89%	2
Democratic Party (DIKO)	57121	17.09%	1
For Europe	36112	10.80%	1
Movement for Social Democracy - United Democratic Union of Centre (EDEK)	36075	10.79%	
United Democrats (EDH) – Political Modernisation			
Movement - European Cyprus	6534	1.95%	
New Horizons (NEO)	5501	1.65%	
Ecological and Environmental Movement (OIKO)	2872	0.86%	
Other	2486	0.74%	
<b>Total</b>	<b>334268</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>6</b>

The percentage of Cypriot registered voters who cast their ballots reached 70.4%, a number that is lower compared to the turn out percentages in previous elections. The percentages of registered voters who had cast their ballots in each district were determined as follows: 73% in the Larnaca and Paphos districts, 72.5% in the Famagusta district, 70% in the Nicosia district, and 69% in the Limassol district. The sum of valid votes in the European Parliament elections compared to the sum of valid votes for the Presidential elections in 2003 (or for the legislative elections in 2001) is about 80000 lower. This means that in addition to the usual abstention in previous elections, the European Parliament elections show a significant percentage of extra abstention that is calculated at about 20% of those who usually vote. For the following analysis when abstention estimates are referred, they will be estimates of this extra abstention.

*Ecological inference*

Using King's method we estimate the percentage of Papadopoulos' voters who decided to abstain during the European Parliament elections. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.253. This means that 25.3% of Papadopoulos' voters have not gone to the polling stations at the elections day. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 3.

**Map 3 Abstention within Papadopoulos' voters**



Abstention within Papadopoulos' voters in each district does not seem closely related to the referendum estimates presented in Section 2. Map 3 indicates that abstention within Papadopoulos' voters was similar in four of the districts and only in Paphos district there is a significant difference. The results in Map 1 indicate that the strength of the rejection of the Annan plan was larger in Paphos but the general patterns of Maps 1 and 3 do not match.

The pattern of Map 3 is justified in a better way if we take into account the distribution of the powers of the political parties that have supported Papadopoulos in the presidential elections. Most of Papadopoulos' power originates from voters of AKEL, DIKO and EDEK. A percentage of more than 25% of Papadopoulos' power corresponds to DIKO voters. This percentage is almost uniform in every district. On the other hand the percentage of AKEL voters within Papadopoulos' power is different between the districts. In Famagusta and Larnaca it is more than 50%, in Limassol and Nicosia it is more than 40%, but in Paphos it is about 30%. In the latter district it is the percentage of EDEK voters within Papadopoulos' power that exhibits a significant raise to about 30% while in the rest districts it is less than 20%. From the aforementioned percentages it seems that among Papadopoulos' voters, AKEL voters were those with a greater abstention rate. This is also justified by the difference (about 50000) of AKEL power between legislative and European Parliament elections and it is in agreement with poll results<sup>10</sup>.

Using King's method we estimate the percentage of Clerides' voters who decided to abstain during the European Parliament elections. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.177. This means that 17.7% of Clerides' voters have not gone to the polling stations at the elections day. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 4.

**Map 4 Abstention within Clerides' voters**



Abstention within Clerides' voters in each district seems related to the referendum estimates presented in Section 2. Famagusta and Larnaca are the districts where Clerides' supporters showed greater will to accept the Annan plan in the referendum and as it is shown in Map 4 these are the districts with the smaller percentages of abstention.


The comparison between Papadopoulos' and Clerides' voters indicates that the abstention is greater in the former group. The abstention in Papadopoulos' voters group is about 1.5 times the abstention in Clerides' voters group. Of course a reason of abstention is indifference as people are electing national representatives for the European parliament who do not result in an executive government that will deal with the voters' everyday problems. Also abstention often has purely domestic reasons, i.e. punishment of the government. Euroscepticism could be another reason. In Cyprus it seems that another factor played its role for the abstention. It seems that some Cypriots were displeased from the pressure imposed upon them from the European Union to accept the Annan plan. This could justify the different rates of abstention between Papadopoulos' and Clerides' voters.

Using King's method we estimate the percentage of Clerides' voters who voted for Democratic Rally during the European Parliament elections. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.554. This means that 55.4% of Clerides' voters voted for Democratic Rally at the elections day. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 5.

The pattern of Map 5 is identical to the pattern of the Map 2 that shows the percentages of Clerides' supporters who accepted the Annan Plan. The percentage of Clerides' supporters who voted for DISY in each district in the European Parliament elections is about the percentage of Clerides' supporters who accepted the Annan plan

in the referendum with an increase of about 20% - 25%. This means that the majority of those of Clerides' supporters, who disputed his attitude and position on the Annan plan, remained against his political party during the European elections. This finding is in agreement with poll results<sup>11</sup> that show that between those who rejected the Annan plan, 83% states that the attitudes of the candidates on the Annan plan is an important factor for their choice on the European Parliament elections (56% very important and 27% important).

**Map 5 Clerides' voters voting Democratic Rally**



Using King's method we estimate the percentage of Clerides' voters who voted for Democratic Party during the European Parliament elections. The estimated value of  $B_i^b$  is 0.080. This means that 8.0% of Clerides' voters voted for Democratic Party at the elections day. The estimated percentages for each district are presented in Map 6.

The pattern of Map 6 is similar to the patterns of Maps 2 and 6. This means that there is a percentage of Clerides' voters who were lead directly to the political party of President Papadopoulos, the main Clerides' opponent in the 2003 presidential elections.

Similar patterns have also been found in maps prepared about displeased Clerides' voters moving towards the political party EDEK and the coalition "For Europe". The latter coalition also collected the majority of Markides' supporters. These maps are available upon request.

**Map 6 Clerides' voters voting Democratic Party**



**4. Conclusions**

The Greek Cypriots' vote analysis indicates the following: Papadopoulos' supporters formed a compact group; the vast majority of them followed their leader's encouragement to reject the Annan Plan. Clerides' campaign was not adequate to convince the independents and the swing groups. The campaign was not even successful in keeping intact Democratic Rally grass roots. As a result, the majority of Clerides' supporters voted against the Annan plan.

Another important issue with the above results seems to be the magnitude of spatial differences in people's vote. In some cases spatial differences are more important than other factors. A comparison between Paphos and Famagusta Districts provides enough evidence for the importance of spatial factors. Spatial differences should be taken into account in every attempt for the political analysis of any elections results and ecological inference could help towards this direction.

Finally, the analysis of the results of the elections for the European Parliament shows that the referendum which had taken place six weeks before the elections played a significant role on Greek Cypriots' attitude during the elections. This is something that was also observed in recent studies of parliamentary elections<sup>12</sup>. DISY has suffered the bigger loss. Although it seems to be the winner of the elections, this was a result of the greater abstention among AKEL voters and it cannot be explained as an approval of the attitudes of the political leaders of DISY towards the Annan plan.

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